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AIDS AND RAPE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
DIMENSIONS OF MANDATORY TESTING
OF SEX OFFENDERS
Every victim of a violent sexual assault faces the possibility of
becoming infected with acquired immune deficiency syndrome
("AIDS"). Since the incubation period for the AIDS virus is com-
monly six to twelve weeks, the only way a victim can immediately
determine if she' has been exposed to AIDS is to know whether her
attacker is an AIDS carrier.
In 1988, California amended its penal code to require that any
person bound over for a violent sexual assault be tested for AIDS.2
The result of the test is then released to the victim, so that she might
take precautions to protect her own health and the health of others.3
In stark contrast, New York will not compel the attacker to be tested
against his will.4 Further, should the attacker have been previously
tested, New York will not allow the victim to receive the test results
unless the prosecutor can demonstrate that there is a "clear and im-
minent danger to an individual whose life or health may unknow-
ingly be at significant risk as a result of contact with the [accused]." 5
New York and California represent two extremes of state response
to this complex issue:6 California makes the victim's right to know
1 Because female rape victims outnumber male rape victims twelve to one, BUREAU
OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTIcs-1987 221 (1988),
this Note uses the feminine pronoun to refer to the victim.
2 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524.1(b)(1) (West Supp. 1990).
3 Id
4 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2781.1 (McKinney Supp. 1990).
5 Id. § 2785.2(b) Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, and Vermont also do not allow the vic-
tim access to the defendant's test results unless the victim is able to demonstrate com-
pelling need. In assessing compelling need, each of these states' statutes instructs the
court to weigh "the need for disclosure against the privacy interest of the test subject
and the public interest which may be disserved by disclosure which deters future testing
or which may lead to discrimination." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1203(10)(a) (Supp.
1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111/2, para. 7309(i) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 141.23(g)(1) (West 1989); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1705(a) (Supp. 1989). Illinois
also requires that the defendant give his informed consent to the testing procedure it-
self. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1111/2, para. 7304. This requirement effectively blocks any
chance of the victim obtaining the results of the test.
6 Colorado and Texas, like California, require that the accused be tested for AIDS,
and that the results then be released to the victim. COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-415 (Supp.
1989); TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 21.31 (Vernon 1989).
Georgia, Indiana, Michigan, North Dakota, South Carolina, and West Virginia pro-
vide for the testing of defendants, but not until the defendant is found guilty. See GA.
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absolute as long as there is cause to believe that the assault involved
the transfer of body fluids; 7 New York protects the defendant's right
to privacy by requiring that the prosecutor demonstrate "clear and
imminent danger" before invading that right.
This Note examines the constitutionality of the California and
New York statutes by considering whether a mandatory test for
AIDS is reasonable in light of the fourth amendment, and whether
disclosure of AIDS test results violates the accused's right to pri-
vacy. Part I briefly sketches the current medical knowledge regard-
ing AIDS etiology, testing, transmission and treatment, and then
outlines the California and New York statutes. Part II analyzes the
constitutionality of the California and New York statutes in light of
that medical knowledge from two perspectives. First, it examines
the reasonableness of mandatory AIDS testing under the fourth
amendment; second, it considers the effect that disclosure of AIDS
test results may have on a constitutionally protected privacy right.8
CODE ANN. § 17-10-15 (1990) (testing is discretionary; any test result available as of
right to victim); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-38-1-10.5 to -10.6 (Bums Supp. 1990)
(mandatory testing at conviction; results disclosed to victim); MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 333.5129 (West Supp. 1990) (mandatory testing at conviction; results available to vic-
tim); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23.07-07.5 (Supp. 1989) (mandatory testing); id § 23.07-02.2
(results made available "to the extent necessary to protect the health or life of any indi-
vidual"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-740 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989) (mandatory testing
within fifteen days of conviction; victim to be notified of results); W. VA. CODE § 16-3C-
2(f)(2) (Supp. 1990) (mandatory testing); ad § 16-3C-3(a)(8) (before victim receives re-
sults, court must "weigh the need for disclosure against the privacy interest of the test
subject and the public interest").
Hawaii, Maine, North Carolina, Virginia, and Wisconsin allow access to the test re-
sults with a court order, but the defendant must give his informed consent before the
test may be administrated. HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 325-101(a), 325-16(a) (Supp. 1989); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 19203-A(1), 19203-D(2)(e) (1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 130A-
143(6), 130A-148(h) (1989); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 36.1(7), 32.1-37.2 (1989); Wis. STAT.
ANN. §§ 146.025(2), 146.025(5)(9) (West 1989). However, Maine and Virginia do not
require informed consent when exposure occurs in a health care facility. ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 5, § 19203-A(4) (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-45.1 (Supp. 1990).
Florida requires that the victim obtain a court order before being granted access to
the results of the accused's blood test, but the state does not require that the accused
consent to the test. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.609(i)(6) (West Supp. 1990). Likewise,
Oklahoma requires a court order, but does not address the issue of consent. OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-502.2(A)(1) (West Supp. 1990).
Rhode Island requires that the defendant be tested upon incarceration, R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 42-56-37 (1989), but the results of that test may not be released to the victim
without prior written consent of the defendant. Id. §§ 11-34-10, 23-6-14(h), 23-6-17.
7 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524.1(b)(1) (West Supp. 1990).
8 Mandatory AIDS testing does not implicate the fifth amendment protection
against self-incrimination because blood test results are not testimonial evidence. See
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (the fifth amendment only prohibits
the admission of self-incriminating testimonial evidence, not real evidence like blood
tests).
Moreover, although the presumption of innocence is a part of the defendant's con-
stitutional right to a fair trial, see Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) ("The
right to a fair trial is a fundamental liberty secured by the Fourteenth Amendment [and]
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Because neither statute fully recognizes the competing interests at
stake or the peculiarities of AIDS testing and treatment, this Note
concludes by proposing a statute that recognizes the victim's need
to know the AIDS status of the accused, and at the same time ac-
knowledges the privacy interests implicated by such disclosure.
I
BACKGROUND
A. Current Medical Knowledge Concerning AIDS
AIDS is caused by the human immunodeficiency virus
("HIV"),9 a retrovirus that enters the immune system' 0 and attaches
itself to the host cell's reproductive machinery,'1 where it replicates
and gradually renders the immune system inoperative. 12
1. Testing
Two tests are used to determine if someone is an AIDS carrier:
enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay ("ELISA") and the Western
Blot.13 Neither of these tests actually detects the presence of HIV;
rather, they test the individual's blood for the presence of anti-
[t]he presumption of innocence ... is a basic component of a fair trial.") (citation omit-
ted), reh'g denied, 426 U.S. 954 (1976), the presumption of innocence refers to the bur-
den of proof and has no bearing on the pretrial rights of the accused. See Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979) (" 'The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in
favor of the accused' ... has no application to a determination of the rights of a pretrial
detainee .. .") (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895)).
9 David D. Ho, Tarsem Moudgil & Masud Alam, Quantitation of Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus Type I in the Blood of Infected Persons, 321 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1621 (1989).
For detailed explanations of AIDS, see DR.VICTOR G. DANIELS, AIDS: THE ACQUIRED
IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME (2d ed. 1987); INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CONFRONTING
AIDS: UPDATE 1988 33, 56, 123-509 (1988) [hereinafter CONFRONTING AIDS II]; INSTI-
TUTE OF MEDICINE, CONFRONTING AIDS: DIRECTIONS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH, HEALTH CARE
AND RESEARCH 37-76 (1986) [hereinafter CONFRONTING AIDS I].
10 The immune system is comprised of lymphocytes, which are special white blood
cells composed of B-cells and T-cells. B-cells produce the antibodies that identify and
begin to destroy disease-causing organisms; T-cells are divided into two groups-T4
helper cells, which encourage the B-cells to produce more antibodies, and suppressor
cells, which work to shut down B-cell production once infection is overcome. V. DAN-
IELS, supra note 9, at 147-48.
11 HIV is termed a "retrovirus" because of its ability to attach itself to the host cell's
reproductive machinery. HIV's genetic code is contained in a single strand of RNA
which is transferred into the host cell's DNA via an enzyme (reverse transcriptase) which
has been encoded by HIV. Since genetic information usually flows from DNA to RNA,
the reversal of the virus's genetic flow of information makes the virus a retrovirus. CON-
FRONTING AIDS I, supra note 9, at 41.
12 V. DANIELS, supra note 9, at 45-46. HIV shuts down the immune system by grad-
ually killing off T4 helper cells. This depletion of T4 cells has two effects: first, B-cell
antibody production drops sharply, limiting the body's ability to fight infection; second,
the ratio of helper to suppressor cells (normally 2.4:1) is reversed, effectively shutting
down what little antibody production is still taking place. Id. at 51, 148.
13 CONFRONTING AIDS I, supra note 9, at 113.
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bodies formed in reaction to HIV. 14 ELISA is significantly less relia-
ble than the Western Blot, but is also significantly cheaper.1 5 As a
result, the standard methodology for HIV testing is to subject every
positive ELISA result to a confirmatory Western Blot.16
Testing for HIV is inherently inexact. Since ELISA and the
Western Blot test for the presence of antibodies rather than HIV,
there is generally a three to twelve week delay after exposure before
either test will yield a positive result.' 7 Although some individuals
infected with HIV still test negative at twelve weeks, by six months
HIV antibodies appear in virtually every case.' 8 During this latency
period, an individual infected with HIV is fully capable of transmit-
ting the virus, even though he would test HIV negative.' 9 This tim-
ing problem is compounded by a high incidence of false positives.20
Both ELISA and the Western Blot were developed to test for the
presence of HIV in donated blood, not to determine whether some-
one is an HIV carrier.2' As a result, the tests have been designed to
err on the side of false positives rather than false negatives. 22
2. Transmission
The risk of contracting AIDS from a single incident of vaginal
intercourse with someone who is a carrier of HIV is estimated at
between 1 in 500 and 1 in 1000.23 Several studies suggest that the
14 Michael J. Barry, Paul D. Cleary, Harvey V. Fineberg, Screening for HIV Infection:
Risks, Benefits, and Burden of Proof, 14 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 259, 260 (1986) [herein-
after Screening]. See also CONFRONTING AIDS II, supra note 9, at 71.
15 Screening, supra note 14, at 260.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 261. The point at which antibodies begin to form in reaction to the virus is
termed seroconversion. CONFRONTING AIDS I, supra note 9, at 44.
18 CONFRONTING AIDS I, supra note 9, at 114. Some infected individuals have con-
tinued to test HIV negative for long periods of time, but it is impossible to estimate the
prevalence of these virus-positive antibody-negative individuals in the population. Id. at
191.
19 V. DAmELs, supra note 9, at 69.
20 Screening, supra note 14, at 262.
21 Id.
22 Id. Among high risk populations, the risk of a false positive result is extremely
small-only 0.57o of the individuals testing positive are not infected with HIV. Il at
263. The Centers for Disease Control, which monitor the prevalence of AIDS in the
United States, name homosexual men, bisexual men, and intravenous drug users as
members of high risk populations. Centers for Disease Control, AIDS and Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus Infection in the United States: 1988 Update, 38 MollDrry & MORTALITY
WEEKLY REP. S-4, 7 [hereinafter 1988 Update]. However, among low risk populations
the risk of a false positive result increases dramatically. Of those individuals testing
positive, 28.2% are not infected with HIV. Screening, supra note 14, at 263.
23 Norman Hearst & Stephen B. Hulley, Preventing the Heterosexual Spread of AIDS:
Are We Giving Our Patients the Best Advice, 259 J. AM. MED. A. 2428, 2429 (1988) (citing a
paper presented by Nancy Padian, J. Wiley and Warren Winkelstein at the Third Inter-
national Conference on AIDS). Taking the worst case scenario, if a rapist were from a
high risk category in which the prevalence of HIV was 1 in 20, the risk of getting AIDS
1990]
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risk of transmission is increased through either additional expo-
sures24 or anal intercourse. 25 However, the lack of any consistent
correlation between transmission and either the number of en-
counters or the type of sexual practice suggests that transmission is
more dependent upon biological factors such as the individual re-
cipient's susceptibility to HIV and the infectiousness of the virus.26
3. Treatment
Zidovudine ("AZT") 27 is the only drug proven to limit HIV pro-
duction.28 Although AZT is proven to extend the lives of persons
with AIDS, its use raises several concerns. First, AZT is notoriously
toxic-it suppresses bone marrow production, leaving the AIDS pa-
tient highly susceptible to bacterial infections. 29 In addition, users
of AZT complain of numerous side effects including nausea, muscle
pain, insomnia, and severe headaches.30 Finally, AZT is very expen-
would be 1 in 10,000 (1/500 x 1/20). If the rapist were from a low risk category, in
which the prevalence rate was 1 in 10,000, the risk would be 1 in 5,000,000.
24 1988 Update, supra note 22, at 8. Transmission risk between steady heterosexual
partners, one of whom is HIV positive, has been documented to range from 0%o to 58%.
The disparate results of different studies stem from the sizes of the groups being tested,
which in every case numbered under 100. Id
25 Nancy Padian, Linda Marquis, Donald P. Francis, Robert E. Anderson, George
W. Rutherford, Paul M. O'Malley & Warren Winkelstein, Male-to-Female Transmission of
the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 258J. AM. MED. A. 788, 789 (1987). Oral intercourse
has not been shown to increase the risk of transmission, but this is probably a reflectio
of monitoring techniques-although HIV has been isolated in saliva, no transmission
has been documented between subjects who have engaged solely in oral intercourse. Id-
26 Gerald H. Friedland & Robert S. Klein, Transmission of the Human Immunodeficienc
Virus, 317 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1125, 1129 (1987). In fact, there are reported cases in
which an individual who is HIV positive has been incapable of transmitting the virus to
another. Note, AIDS: Legal Issues in Search of a Cure, 14 WM. MrrCHELL L. REv. 575, 616
(1988) (authored by Wendy A. Weber).
27 AZT is also known as azidothymidine and the trade name Retrovir. Centers for
Disease Control, Public Health Service Statement on Management of Occupational Exposure to
HIV, Including Considerations Regarding Zidovudine Postexperience Use, 39 MORTALIT & MoR-
BIDrrY WEEKLY REP., RR-1 (199) [hereinafter PHS Statement].
28 Margaret A. Fischl, Douglas D. Richman, Michael H. Grieco, Michael S. Gottlieb,
Paul A. Volberding, Oscar L. Laskin, John M. Leedom, Jerome E. Groopman, Donna
Mildvan, Robert T. Schoolley, George G. Jackson, David T. Durack, Donnie King & the
AZT Collaborative Working Group, The Efficacy of Azidothymidine (AZT) in the Treatment of
Patients with AIDS and AIDS-Related Complex, 317 NEw ENG. J. MED. 185 (1987). AZT
works by inhibiting HIV replication within the host cell. See supra notes 11 & 12.
29 Zidovudine in Symptomless HIV Infection, The Lancet, February 25, 1989, at 415.
AZT's suppression of bone marrow production causes severe anemia, and necessitates
that individuals taking the drug undergo frequent blood transfusions. N.Y. Times, Jan.
17, 1990, at A6, col. 4.
30 Zidovudine in Symptomless HIV Infection, supra note 29, at 415. Continued use of
AZT also induces muscle disease in some individuals. It.; see also A.J. Pinching, M.
Helbert, B. Peddle, D. Robinson, K. Janes, D. Gor, D.J. Jeffries, C. Stoneham, D. Mitch-
ell, A.E. Kocsis, J. Mann, S.M. Forster &J.R.W. Harris, Clinical Experience with Zidovudine
for Patients with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome-and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome-
242 [Vol. 76:238
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sive-the annual cost to an individual being treated for AIDS is over
$3000.31
Until recently,3 2 doctors did not prescribe AZT unless the indi-
vidual testing HIV positive had developed symptoms associated
with AIDS.33 However, in August 1989, the National Institute of
Health ("NIH") announced that AZT can delay the onset of AIDS in
some individuals who are infected with HIV but are not yet
symptomatic.34 Moreover, inJanuary 1990, NIH recommended cut-
ting the recommended dosage of AZT in half.35 In addition to mak-
ing AZT somewhat more affordable, the reduced dosage
ameliorates bone marrow suppression as well as other side effects. 36
Because of these new developments, AZT is now routinely pre-
scribed to treat asymptomatic carriers of HIV.3 7
NIH is also currently studying the effect AZT may have in actu-
ally preventing HIV from developing in persons who have been
"massively exposed" to the virus through needle sticks, blood
splashes or semen.38 NIH believes that AZT may be effective as a
prophylactic agent for two reasons. First, in animal studies AZT
prevented the development of infection after the animals had been
Related Complex, 18J. INFECnON (Supp. I) 33, 37-39 (1989) (clinical analysis of AZT's side
effects); PHS Statement, supra note 26, at 4.
31 N.Y. Times, January 17, 1990, at A6, col. 4 (annual cost estimated at $3285).
Burroughs-Wellcome, the manufacturer of AZT, charges distributors $1.20 for each
100mg capsule, to which distributors add approximately 30 cents. N.Y. Times, Septem-
ber 19, 1989, at Al, col. 1. Since the recommended dose of AZT is 600mg/day, the
daily cost is $9.00.
32 See N.Y. Times, August 19, 1989, at Al, col. 1. (announcement that AZT helps
asymptomatic patients will lead many more doctors to prescribe AZT).
33 The Centers for Disease Control list 19 diseases as indicative of AIDS. See CEN-
TERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, MMWR REPORTS ON AIDS:JUNE 1986-DECEMBER 1987 82-
94 (1988) [hereinafter MMWR REPORTS].
34 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES, AIDS CLINICAL
TRIAL STUDY GROUP, PROTOCOL 019 (August 31, 1989) [hereinafter PROTOCOL 019].
Copies of the protocol may be obtained from the AIDS Clinical Trials Service at
(800)874-2572.
The study shows that for those individuals who have tested HIV positive and whose
T4 count is less than 500/mm3 , AZT delays the progression of AIDS. As ofJanuary 1,
1990, Protocol 019 was still continuing for those with T4 counts greater than 500/mm3 .
35 N.Y. Times, January 17, 1990, at A6, col. 4.
36 Id See also PHS Statement, supra note 27, at 4.
37 For a summary of recent treatment development, see Final Report of State-of-
the-Art Conference on AZT Therapy for Early HIV Infection (March 3-4 1990). Copies
of the Final Report may be obtained from the AIDS Clinical Trials Service at (800)874-
2572.
38 AIDS CLINICAL TRIALS INFORMATION SERVICE, CusToM DATABASE SEARCH, PRO-
TOCOL NS 402 FOR MASSIVE EXPOSURE 1 [hereinafter PROTOCOL NS 402] (search per-
formed October 24, 1989). Copies of the protocol may be obtained from AIDS Clinical
Trials Service at (800)874-2572.
The United States Public Health Service has also released guidelines, PHS Statement,
supra note 27, that recommend workers exposed to HIV in an occupational setting be
told of AZT's potential as a prophylactic agent.
1990] 243
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exposed to a retrovirus similar to HIV.3 9 Second, prior studies40
have demonstrated that AZT is effective in delaying the progression
of AIDS in persons who have tested HIV positive but are not yet
symptomatic. 4 1
B. The Statutes
During its 1988 session, the California legislature enacted an
AIDS testing statute as part of the Penal Code (the "California stat-
ute").42 The legislature's express purpose in passing this statute
was
to benefit the victim of a crime by informing the victim whether
the defendant is infected with the AIDS virus. It [was] also the
intent of the Legislature ... to protect the health of both victims
of crime and those accused of committing a crime. 43
The statute requires the court to issue a search warrant to obtain
and test the accused's blood whenever the court has probable cause
to believe that blood or semen was transferred from the accused to
the victim. 44 If the test result is positive, the results are confirmed 45
and then disclosed to the victim.46
That same year, the New York legislature passed a comprehen-
sive AIDS bill (the "New York statute") as part of its Public Health
Law.47 The New York statute differs from the California statute in
two ways: it strictly limits mandatory HIV testing4" and it guaran-
tees the confidentiality of test results. 49
The New York statute limits testing by requiring that the test
subject give his written, informed consent to be tested unless he has
39 PROTOCOL NS 402, supra note 38.
40 The Amsterdam Municipal Health Service conducted a study producing similar
results to those reported in PROTOCOL 019. J.M.A. Lange, F. de Wolfe, J.W. Mulder,
R.A. Coutinho, J. van der Noordaa & J. Goudsmit, Markers for Progression to Acquired Im-
mune Deficiency Syndrome and Zidovudine Treatment of Asymptomatic Patients, 18 J. INFECTION
(Supp. I) 85 (1989).
41 PROTOCOL 019, supra note 34, at 1.
42 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524.1 (West Supp. 1990).
43 Id. § 1524.1(a).
44 Id. § 1524.1(b)(1). Prior to releasing the results of the HIV test, the health de-
partment must provide professional counseling to the recipients of the test results. Id.
§ 152 4 .1(g).
45 Id § 1524.1(f).
46 Id. § 1524.1(g). The California statute specifically limits the test to informational
purposes by providing that the results of the blood test may not be used in the criminal
proceeding, nor as the impetus for a charging decision by the prosecutor. Id
§§ 1524.1(a), (k). Since the results may not be introduced at trial, the accused's right to
a fair trial is protected. See supra note 8.
47 N.Y. PuB. HEL.Tm LAw §§ 2780-2787 (McKinney Supp. 1990).
48 Id § 2781.
49 Id §§ 2782, 2783, 2785.
244 [Vol. 76:238
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put his HIV status in issue, or the test is authorized by law. 50
Neither of these exceptions gives the victim of a sexual offense the
right to have the defendant tested for AIDS. The statute's first ex-
ception refers directly51 to rule 3121 of New York Civil Practice
Laws and Rules, 52 which is designed to aid discovery in civil trials
where one of the parties, as part of a claim or defense, has placed his
or her own physical condition in issue. This discovery rule does not
apply to mandatory testing of persons accused of sexual offenses
because the victim's desire to test the defendant for HIV arises in a
criminal context, and because the defendant has not put his own
HIV status in issue.53 The second exception to the requirement of
informed consent allows an HIV test to be performed if it is author-
ized or required by state or federal law.5 At present, no state or
federal statute mandates HIV testing of those accused of sex crimes.
The only law that might be read to require such a test governs court
ordered discovery. 55 However, since there is no reason a prosecu-
tor needs to discover the offender's HIV status in order to prose-
cute, the victim should be unable to obtain a court order for a
mandatory test.56
The New York statute also guarantees the confidentiality of
HIV test results.57 In certain limited applications, the New York
50 I& § 2781(1). In addition, the statute does not require informed consent if the
individual is not competent to give his or her informed consent. In such a case, the
victim must obtain the consent "of a person authorized pursuant to law to consent to
health care for the individual." Id.
51 Id.
52 N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. 3121 (McKinney 1974 & Supp. 1990).
53 SeeJoiNT SUBCOMMrITEE ON AIDS IN THE CRIMINALJUSTICE SYSTEM OF THE COM-
MrrEE ON CORRECrIONS AND THE COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE OPERATIONS AND
BUDGET OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YoRx, AIDS AND THE
CRIMINALJUSTICE SYSTEM: A FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 72 (1989) [hereinaf-
ter FINAL REPORT].
54 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2781(1) (McKinney Supp. 1990).
55 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.40(2) (McKinney 1982).
56 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 53, at 72 n.85.
57 N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2782, 2783, 2785 (McKinney 1990). By ensuring
strict confidentiality of all HIV test results, the legislature hoped to encourage voluntary
HIV testing so that individuals would subsequently change their behavior to reduce the
risk of transmission:
The legislature recognizes that maximum confidentiality protection
for information related to human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection
and acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) is an essential public
health measure. In order to retain the full trust and confidence of per-
sons at risk, the state has an interest both in assuring that HIV related
information is not improperly disclosed and in having dear and certain
rules for the disclosure of such information. By providing additional pro-
tection of the confidentiality of HIV related information, the legislature
intends to encourage the expansion of voluntary confidential testing for
the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) so that individuals may come
forward, learn their health status, make decisions regarding the appropri-
1990] 245
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statute allows health care providers, public health officers, adoption
agencies, parole officers, and correctional facilities severely re-
stricted access to HIV test results.58 The only instance in which the
court may breach this confidentiality is upon an application showing
"a clear and imminent danger to an individual whose life or health
may unknowingly be at risk as a result of contact with the individual
to whom the information pertains." 59 In assessing clear and immi-
nent danger, the New York statute instructs the court to "weigh the
need for disclosure against the privacy interest of the protected indi-
vidual and the public interest which may be disserved by disclosure




A. Mandatory Testing for HIV: Violation of the Fourth
Amendment?
1. Constitutional Framework
The fourth amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against un-
reasonable searches and seizures." 61  For a court to judge the
mandatory HIV testing of accused sex offenders unconstitutional
under the fourth amendment, the HIV test must be considered a
"search" for the purposes of the fourth amendment, and that search
must be unreasonable. 62
ate treatment, and change the behavior that puts them and others at risk
of infection.
The legislature also recognizes that strong confidentiality protec-
tions can limit the risk of discrimination and the harm to an individual's
interest in privacy that unauthorized disclosure of HIV related informa-
tion can cause. It is the intent of the legislature that exceptions to the
general rule of confidentiality... be strictly construed.
1988 N.Y. Laws ch. 584, § 1, quoted in N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 2780 (McKinney Supp.
1990).
58 N.Y. PUB. HEAmH LAW § 2782(1) (McKinney Supp. 1990).
59 Id. § 2785(2)(b).
60 Id. § 2785(5). With the addition of "or treatment" in the New York statute, its
language is the same as that in the Delaware, Illinois, Iowa and Vermont statutes. See
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1203(10)(c) (Supp. 1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1111/2, para.
7309(i) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); IOWA CODE ANN. § 141.23(g)(1) (West Supp. 1989);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1705(a) (Supp. 1989).
61 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
62 In addition, because the Bill of Rights only protects the people against govern-
ment action, the search must be performed by the government or one of its agents. See
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1411 (1989).
[Vol. 76:238246
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a. Three perspectives on the fourth amendment balancing test for
reasonableness: law enforcement searches, administrative
searches, and "special needs" searches
In Schmerber v. California,63 the Supreme Court held that a com-
pulsory blood test constitutes a "search" under the fourth amend-
ment. 64 Since ELISA and the Western Blot are blood tests, 65 they
are both searches for the purposes of the fourth amendment.
However, the fourth amendment prohibits only "unreasonable
searches."'6 6 Whether a search is reasonable is determined by bal-
ancing the government's need to conduct the search against the in-
vasion which the search entails. 67 In application, the Court has
approached the balancing test from three different perspectives, de-
pending on whether the search furthers law-enforcement aims,68
implements administrative regulations, 69 or fulfills some "special
need." 70
Law-enforcement searches are conducted for the purpose of
collecting evidence to be used in prosecutions. Generally, the Court
has ruled that to be reasonable, these searches must be conducted
pursuant to a warrant issued on probable cause. 71 Since the govern-
ment's need for the search does not vary within the context of law
enforcement, departures from the warrant and probable cause
requirements turn on the intrusiveness of the search. Minimally in-
trusive searches require less than probable cause,72 while some
63 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
64 Id. at 767. The following term, Justice Harlan enunciated a two-part test for
determining whether a search fell within the protection of the fourth amendment: the
person being searched must have a subjective expectation of privacy, and society must
be prepared to recognize that expectation as reasonable. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). In Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740
(1979), the Court adopted Harlan's test, and the Court in Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1412 (1989), applied the Harlan formulation to
blood tests, finding it "obvious that this physical intrusion, penetrating beneath the skin,
inftinges an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable."
65. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
66 U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
67 See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (law enforcement search);
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967) (administrative search) New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985) ("special needs" search).
68 See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
69 See infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
70 See infra notes 79-107 and accompanying text.
71 See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983); United States v. United
States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 314-15 (1972).
72 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (stop and frisk of outer garments only
requires that police officer have reasonable suspicion); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975) (roving border patrol stops require only reasonable suspicion);
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562 (1976) (checkpoint border stops are




searches may be so intrusive as to be unreasonable even if con-
ducted pursuant to a warrant issued on probable cause.73
Administrative searches are undertaken to enforce a regulatory
health or safety code. As with law-enforcement searches, the Court
has usually required that these searches be conducted pursuant to a
warrant issued on probable cause,74 but not every administrative
search requires a warrant to be considered reasonable. In perform-
ing the reasonableness balance, the Court evaluates the intrusive-
ness of the search in light of the government regulation to which the
entity75 being searched is already subject. When government regu-
lation of that entity is pervasive, the invasiveness of the search may
be so minimal as to justify a warrantless search.76
Even when the Court has found that a warrantless administra-
tive search is not unreasonable, the Court has still insisted on a
showing of probable cause. However, in contrast to the probable
cause requirement in law enforcement and "special needs"
searches, the probable cause requirement in the context of adminis-
trative searches does not mean that the government must show
some quantum of evidence. Instead, the government must meet
"reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting
[the search]." ' 77 Thus, probable cause to conduct a housing code
inspection exists so long as reasonable standards governing housing
inspections exist, and those standards have been satisfied with re-
spect to the particular inspection.78
The Supreme Court has termed searches that neither aid law
enforcement nor help implement regulatory schemes "special
needs" searches, and evaluates these searches using a two-step ap-
proach. First, the Court balances the state interest against the intru-
sion occasioned by the search, as it does with law-enforcement and
73 Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766 (1985) (surgery to remove bullet).
74 Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 316 (1978) (warranless OSHA inspec-
tion unreasonable); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 529 (1967) (warrantless
housing inspection unreasonable).
75 The Court has never found a search of an individual's person to fall within the
category of administrative searches. Rather, this approach has been reserved for
searches of homes, Camara, 387 U.S. at 525, and businesses, New York v. Burger, 482
U.S. 691, 702 (1987) (junkyards); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598 (1981) (mines);
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 313 (1972) (pawn shops).
76 See Burger, 482 U.S. at 702; Donovan, 452 U.S. at 599; Biswell, 406 U.S. at 315.
77 Camara, 387 U.S. at 538; see Marshall, 436 U.S. at 320; Frank v. Maryland, 359
U.S. 360, 383 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("Where considerations of health and
safety are involved, the facts that would justify an inference of 'probable cause' to make
an inspection are clearly different from those that would justify such an inference [in a]
criminal investigation .. "); see also Griffen v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 878 n.4 (1987)
(differentiating the two different standards of probable cause).
78 See Camara, 387 U.S. at 538-39; see also Donovan, 452 U.S. at 603 (Mine Safety and
Health Act); Biswell, 406 U.S. at 314 (Gun Control Act).
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administrative searches. Then the Court looks to see whether a
"special need" exists that justifies the departure from the normal
warrant and probable cause requirements. Since Justice Blackmun
first introduced the concept of a "special needs" search in New Jersey
v. T.L. 0.,79 the Court has used this rationale to justify warrantless
searches of effects,80 papers,81 houses,8 2 and persons83 when the
searches were conducted on less than probable cause.
b. "Special needs" balancing applied to searches of the person
The Court first applied its "special needs" analysis to warrant-
less searches of persons" in the companion cases of Skinner v. Rail-
79 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring). Blackmun characterized
the Court's departures from the warrant and probable cause requirements as "excep-
tional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforce-
ment, make the warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable."
80 In T.LO., the Court held that a warrantless search of a student's purse was rea-
sonable because the state's interest in maintaining discipline in its schools outweighed
the student's privacy interest in the contents of her purse. Id. at 340. In striking the
balance, the Court found that this warrantless search was reasonable, even though it was
conducted on less than probable cause, because of the "special need" created by "drug
use and violent crime in the schools." Id. at 339.
The warrant requirement was unsuitable because it would interfere with mainte-
nance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures of the school environment. Id. at
340. Similarly, to require that all searches be conducted only on probable cause would
unnecessarily divert a teacher's time from education. Id. at 342-43.
81 The more attenuated "special need" of workplace efficiency led the Court in
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987), to declare that a warrantless search of an
employee's desk and papers was constitutionally reasonable. The Court held that the
government's interest in the "efficient and proper operation of the workplace," id. at
723, outweighed a government employee's privacy interest in his desk and papers. The
'special need" of workplace efficiency justified the government's failure to obtain a war-
rant prior to conducting the search, even in the absence of probable cause. Id. at 725-
26.
To require the government agency to obtain a warrant would "seriously disrupt the
routine conduct of business," id. at 722, and to insist that the government have probable
cause to search an employee's desk would delay corrections in employee misconduct,
resulting in "tangible and often irreparable damage to the agency's work." Id. at 724.
82 In Griffen v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987), the Court used the "special needs"
rationale to analyze a search of a probationer's home, and held that the state's need to
closely supervise the probation system outweighed the probationer's privacy interest,
even though the state did not have probable cause to conduct the warrantless search. Id.
at 876-79. The Court found that close supervision was a "special need" because it en-
sured the security of the community and reduced recidivism. Id. at 875.
To require a warrant would impermissibly interfere with the probation system in
two ways: first, it would establish a magistrate rather than the probation officer as judge
of how closely the probationer must be supervised; second, the delay occasioned by the
warrant requirement would hinder quick response to misconduct and thereby reduce
the deterrent effect of otherwise expeditious services. Id. at 876. Similarly, to require a
showing of probable cause would also impair the deterrent effect of unannounced
searches. Id. at 878-79.
83 See infra notes 84-107 and accompanying text.
84 In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1414 (1989), the
court cites Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), as an example of a "special needs"
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way Labor Executives'Association 85 and National Treasury Employees Union
v. Von Raab.86 These cases are significant not only for extending the
"special needs" approach to searches of the person, but also for re-
jecting the notion that any showing of probable cause is constitu-
tionally mandated.
Skinner involved a drug testing program that required railroads
to test all employees involved in a major train accident,8 7 an impact
accident,88 or any incident that involved a fatality to an on-duty rail-
road employee.8 9 The Secretary of Transportation promulgated
this testing program in response to the high incidence of docu-
mented drug abuse and drug-related accidents involving railroad
personnel.90 In reaching the conclusion that the Skinner drug test-
ing program was not an unreasonable search under the fourth
amendment, the Court found that railway employee drug use posed
a danger to human life, and therefore constituted a "special need"
that justified this warrantless, suspicionless testing program.9'
In Von Raab, a similar program required that all customs offi-
cials applying for certain positions-those that involved drug in-
terdiction, required the official to carry a gun, or exposed the official
to classified information-be tested for illegal drugs as a pre-
condition to employment or placement. 92 The Treasury Depart-
ment offered three rationales to support its program: first, officers
engaged in drug interdiction should be drug free because of the
"obvious dangers" their position presents;93 second, public safety
search of the person. In Bell, decided six years before the Court began its "special
needs" balancing, a group of pretrial detainees argued that a prison regulation that re-
quired them to submit to a visual body cavity search after every contact visit was uncon-
stitutional. In finding this search reasonable, the Court admitted that the intrusion into
the pretrial detainees' privacy was significant, but nonetheless held that the govern-
ment's interest in maintaining security in pretrial facilities outweighed this privacy inter-
est and justified the invasiveness of the search. Id at 558-61.
85 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
86 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
87 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1408. A major train accident is defined as an accident that
involves either a fatality, the release of hazardous material followed by evacuation, or
damage to railroad property in excess of $500,000. Id.
88 Id. An impact accident is defined as a collision that results in a reportable injury
or in damage to the railroad in excess of $50,000. Id
89 Id. at 1409. Tested employees are required to give both urine and blood sam-
ples. Blood tests reveal the level of drug or alcohol intoxication at the time of the test.
Urine tests are used for testing that occurs some time after the accident, because traces
of the drug will remain in urine longer than in blood. Id.
90 Id. at 1407-08. Between 1972 and 1983, 21 drug-related accidents occurred re-
sulting in 25 fatalities, 61 non-fatal injuries, and $19 million in property damage. Id. at
1408 (citing 48 Fed. Reg. 30,726 (1983)).
91 Id. at 1421-22.
92 National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1389 (1989).
Employees already holding one of these positions would not be tested.
93 Id. at 1388.
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demands that officers who carry guns and who "'are prepared to
make instant life or death decisions be drug free;' 94 and third,
drug-using employees with access to classified documents might be
blackmailed by drug smugglers into revealing sensitive informa-
tion.95 The Court held that Von Raab's warrantless, suspicionless
testing program was reasonable96 because "[t]he Government's
compelling interest[] in preventing the promotion of drug users to
positions where they might endanger the integrity of our Nation's
borders or the life of the citizenry" 97 outweighed the privacy inter-
ests of the employees.98
The Supreme Court's rejection of the probable cause require-
ment for mandatory drug tests in Skinner and Von Raab is central to
the question of mandatory HIV testing: it suggests that
suspicionless HIV tests might be reasonable under the fourth
amendment. Prior to Skinner and Von Raab, the Court had always
required some level of reasonable suspicion that what was being
searched for would be found before concluding that a search of the
person was reasonable.99 In Skinner, the Court rejected this line of
precedent noting that "a showing of individualized suspicion is not
a constitutional floor." 100 The Court then enunciated three condi-
tions that must be satisfied in order for the search to be reasonable
under the fourth amendment: first, the privacy interests implicated
by the search must be minimal; second, the government interest
must be important; and finally, the circumstances must be such that
a requirement of individualized suspicion would place the govern-
ment interest in jeopardy. 10 '
Applying this analysis to the drug testing of railroad employees,
the Skinner Court found the suspicionless testing program to be rea-
94 Id. (quoting Commissioner Von Raab's brief).
95 Id.
96 The Court limited its holding to the applicability of the testing program to those
officials applying for positions that involved drug interdiction or required officals to
carry guns. The Court remanded the case to determine whether the testing program
was reasonable as applied to those who handled classified documents because it was
unclear whether the testing program "encompasses only those Customs employees
likely to gain access to sensitive information." Id. at 1397. Some of the "sensitive"
positions requiring testing were "'Accountant,' 'Accounting Technician,' 'Animal Care-
taker,' 'Attorney (All),' 'Baggage Clerk,' 'Co-op Student (All),' 'Electric Equipment Re-
pairer,' 'Mail Clerk/Assistant,' and 'Messenger.'" Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 1397-98.
99 See, e.g., South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983) (blood test requires indi-
vidualized suspicion); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) (stop and frisk requires
individualized suspicion); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and frisk requires rea-
sonable suspicion); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (blood test for
alcohol requires clear indication that subject will test positive).
100 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1417 (1989).
101 Id.
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sonable in light of the fourth amendment. First, the blood tests re-
quired by the drug testing program are minimal intrusions into the
employees' reasonable expectations of privacy.10 2 Second, the gov-
ernment interest in having only drug-free employees piloting the
nation's railroads is important.103 Finally, to require the govern-
ment to show probable cause or reasonable suspicion before testing
would jeopardize the government interest at stake because the hid-
den nature of drug impairment would not lead the railroad to sus-
pect impairment of any particular employee.3' 4 Having satisfied the
three-part test, the Skinner drug-testing program was held to be a
reasonable search under the fourth amendment.
Similarly, the Von Raab Court held that the suspicionless testing
of Customs employees who applied either for positions in drug in-
terdiction or for positions requiring them to carry a gun was reason-
able. First, as noted in Skinner, the drug tests are a minimal
intrusion into employees' reasonable expectations of privacy. Sec-
ond, the government has a "compelling interest in ensuring that
front-line interdiction personnel are physically fit"'10 5 and a strong
interest in preventing drug users from being promoted to positions
that involve the deadly use of force.10 6 However, unlike in Skinner,
the Court did not address how the requirement of individualized
suspicion might place the government's interest in jeopardy. In-
stead, the Court ignored this third requirement, holding that the
government interest was so important as to "outweigh[ ] the privacy
interests of [Customs] employees."' 10 7
2. The California Statute: No Violation of the Fourth Amendment in
Most Cases
a. The statute is properly analyzed under the "special needs"
approach
Whether the California statute violates the fourth amendment
proscription against unreasonable searches is determined by apply-
ing a reasonableness balance-if the State's interest in conducting
102 Id. at 1417-18. In reaching its conclusion that drug tests are minimal intrusions,
the Court relied on a pervasive regulation rationale similar to that used in the context of
administrative searches. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text. Privacy expecta-
tions of railroad employees are diminished because of "their participation in an industry
that is regulated pervasively to ensure safety, a goal dependent, in substantial part, on
the health and fitness of... employees." Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1418.
103 Id. at 1419.
104 Id.
105 National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1393 (1989).
106 Id. However, the Court failed to find a strong enough government interest to
justify the suspicionless testing of those employees exposed to classified documents. Id
at 1396-97; see supra note 96.
107 Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1392.
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the HIV test outweighs the intrusion into the defendant's privacy
interest, the test is reasonable.108 How this balance is struck turns
on the purpose driving the search.10 9 Because the California stat-
ute's mandate for the HIV testing of sex offenders is part of the
Penal Code,110 it appears to be related to law enforcement. How-
ever, the statute's bar against using any information obtained from
the test as part of a charging decision' or as part of a criminal
trialhl2 indicates that the purpose of this test is not to obtain evi-
dence to aid a criminal prosecution. Thus, the California statute is
not law-enforcement related."i 3
Likewise, California's purpose in protecting the health of its cit-
izens1 4 suggests that the HIV test might be evaluated as an admin-
istrative search." i5 Following the Supreme Court's analysis in the
context of administrative searches, the statute seems reasonable be-
cause the defendant is tested only pursuant to a warrant issued on
probable cause."16 Moreover, the regulatory scheme contained in
the California statute satisfies the relaxed probable cause standard
used in the area of administrative searches. 17 However, the Court
has used the administrative search framework only when analyzing
searches of buildings" 8 and HIV tests are searches of people. Since
searches of people are inherently more intrusive than searches of
buildings and thereby require more protection, the Supreme Court
would likely approach the reasonableness of the California statute
from a "special needs" perspective, as it did with the statutes in-
volved in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab 19 and Skinner
v. Railway Labor Executives'Association.'20
At first glance, the "special needs" analysis seems misplaced in
an analysis of the California statute. Unlike the searches at issue in
every other "special needs" case,' 2 ' the California statute requires
that the search be conducted pursuant to a warrant issued on prob-
108 See supra text accompanying notes 66-67.
109 See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
110 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524.1 (West Supp. 1990).
Ill Id § 1524.1(a).
112 Id § 1524.1(k).
113 See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
114 GAL. PENAL CODE § 1524.1(a) (West Supp. 1990).
115 See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
116 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524.1(b) (West Supp. 1990).
117 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
118 See supra note 75.
119 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
120 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
121 See supra notes 80-82 for discussion of searches of houses, papers, and effects.
See supra notes 99-107 and accompanying text for discussion of probable cause in
searches of the person.
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able cause.122 The statute requires that before a warrant may be
issued authorizing an HIV test of the defendant, the prosecutor
must demonstrate that there is probable cause to believe both that
the defendant committed the crime and that blood or semen was
transmitted from the defendant to the victim.' 23 By requiring this
showing, the statute appears to meet the stricter balancing require-
ment imposed on law-enforcement related searches.' 24 However,
closer analysis reveals that California's probable cause requirement
is really no requirement at all.
Probable cause means "there is a fair probability that contra-
band or evidence will be found."'125 In order for there to be a fair
probability that HIV will be found, the prosecutor should have to
demonstrate that there is probable cause to believe the defendant is
HIV positive. The statute's probable cause requirement, while func-
tioning as a strong and sensible limitation on mandatory HIV test-
ing, is irrelevant to any determination of the defendant's HIV status.
California's failure to require the prosecutor to show probable cause
that the accused sex offender is HIV positive means that the search
occasioned by the HIV test is entirely suspicionless. Suspicionless
searches of the person are reasonable under the fourth amendment
only in the context of "special needs."' 126
b. "Special needs" analysis of the California statute
Under the Supreme Court's "special needs" analysis, the Cali-
fornia statute must satisfy two requirements.' 27 First, the search re-
quired by the statute must be reasonable-California's interest in
conducting the search must outweigh the intrusion the search en-
tails. Second, a "special need" must exist that justifies the suspi-
cionless intrusion into the defendant's privacy.
(i) The reasonableness balance
California's stated purpose in testing accused sex offenders is
"to benefit the victim of a crime by informing the victim whether the
defendant is infected with the AIDS virus" in order "to protect the
health of... victims of crime." 128 The Supreme Court has consist-
122 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524.1(b) (West Supp. 1990).
123 Id.
124 See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
125 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233 (1983).
126 See supra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
127 See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
128 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524.1(a) (West Supp. 1990). The California statute also
expresses an interest in "protect[ing] the health of... those accused of committing a
crime." Id. This interest is not addressed by this Note, but the dangers of such a highly
paternalistic attitude are obvious. It is only a short step from testing sex offenders for
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enfly found that a state's interest in the health of its citizens is
compelling.' 29
However, one might argue that because of the nature of HIV
progression and the imprecision of the HIV test, the strength of this
state interest is undercut in three ways. First, because of the three
to twelve week latency period, the accused might test negative but
still have transmitted HIV to the victim.' 30 Testing the accused in
this situation would not further California's interest in the health of
either the victim or the accused-it would only create a false sense
of security in both parties. Second, if the accused comes from a low
risk population, there is a 28.2%y chance that he will test positive for
HIV even though he does not have AIDS.' 3 ' Rather than revealing
information that can be used to preserve the health of the victim and
the defendant, such information would only create a false sense of
doom. Finally, even if the accused does have AIDS, there is, at
most, a 1 in 500 chance that HIV will be transmitted.' 3 2 Thus, 500
positive test results would seem to implicate California's interest in
the health of the victim only once.
Although these arguments all have merit, they do not render
California's interest in protecting the victim's health any less com-
pelling. First, the possibility of a negative result creating a false
sense of security in the victim is outweighed by the probability that
an accused with HIV will not be in his latency period, and thus will
test HIV positive. This knowledge gives the victim the information
she needs to begin AZT treatment8 3 and to take precautions
against further transmission. Second, the 28.2% risk of a false posi-
tive result is counterbalanced by a 71.8% true positive result, mak-
ing it likely that the information imparted is correct. Moreover, if
the accused is a member of a high risk group, the HIV test is nearly
one hundred percent accurate.I14 Finally, equating the risk of trans-
mission with the compellinguess of the state interest misconstrues
California's interest in the health of the victim. Because the purpose
their own good to testing other groups for their own good. Because this Note is con-
cerned with the conflicting rights of victims and sex offenders, it analyzes California's
stated interest only insofar as it is implicated by the victims of rape.
129 See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (com-
pelling state interest in potential life of fetus); Thornburgh v. American College of Ob-
stetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (compelling state interest in maternal
health); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (compelling, but competing interests in the
health of the mother and the health of the fetus); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523 (1967) (compelling state interest in health of occupants of housing stock subjected
to housing code inspections).
130 See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
131 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
132 See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
133 See supra notes 27-41 and accompanying text.
134 See supra note 22.
1990] 255
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
of the California statute is to impart needed information to the vic-
tim, California's interest in the victim's health is implicated every
time a woman is raped, not every time HIV is transmitted. Without
knowledge of the defendant's HIV status, the possibility of transmis-
sion ranges anywhere from 1 in 500 to 1 in 5,000,000.'3 5 With
knowledge of the defendant's status, this tremendous uncertainty is
greatly reduced. If the defendant tests HIV negative, the victim can
be almost certain that HIV was not transmitted. If the defendant
tests HIV positive, the victim knows that there is a possibility HIV
was transmitted, and she can take steps to protect her own health
and the health of others.
Although the state interest in the health of its citizens is com-
pelling, the "special needs" cases require that the state interest out-
weigh the intrusiveness of an HIV test on the defendant's
reasonable expectations of privacy.' 3 6 Blood tests, as Schmerber
notes, constitute a minimal intrusion on individual privacy-they are
widely used and "involve[ ] virtually no risk, trauma, or pain."' 3 7
Relying on this rationale, the Supreme Court has found that blood
tests undertaken to find evidence of alcohol intoxication 18 or drug
use'3 9 are reasonable under the fourth amendment.
One could argue that the Schmerber rationale cannot be ex-
tended to justify HIV tests as minimally intrusive because HIV
blood tests are fundamentally different from blood tests for alcohol
or drugs. However, the difference between a drug test and an HIV
test lies not in the intrusiveness of the search, but in the privacy
interests affected when the results of the search are disclosed.' 40
Since the fourth amendment is concerned with the physical intru-
sion the search entails and not with the impact of disclosure on the
privacy interests of the defendant,' 4 1 a court should still consider an
HIV blood test to be minimally intrusive.
Although the invasiveness of a blood test is minimal, whether
the test is reasonable turns on whether California's interest in pro-
tecting the health of rape victims outweighs the intrusiveness of the
search.' 42 Because of the nature of HIV's progression and the man-
135 Hearst & Hulley, supra note 23, at 2429.
136 See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
137 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966).
138 Id.
139 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1412 (1989).
140 See infra notes 176-86 and accompanying text.
141 See, e.g. Skinner, 109 S. Ct at 1412 (blood test is a search because it is a "physical
intrusion, penetrating beneath the skin"); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768 (reasonableness of
blood test determined by looking at the "means and procedures employed in taking
[defendant's] blood").
142 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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ner in which the presence of HIV is detected and treated, 143 this
balance changes with the passage of time.
California's interest in the victim's health would outweigh the
intrusion into the defendant's privacy only if the victim's sole means
of determining whether she is at risk from the attack would be to
know whether the defendant is HIV positive. Therefore, before the
defendant may be tested, the victim must test herself for HIV. If the
victim tests positive, either as the result of a prior encounter or
through rapid seroconversion, 144 the necessity of testing the de-
fendant would be obviated, and the defendant's privacy interest
would outweigh the state's interest in the health of the victim.
If the victim tested HIV negative, the defendant should be
tested only if less than six months have passed since the attack. Be-
cause seroconversion occurs in virtually every case within six
months of transmission, 145 by six months after the attack, any
knowledge that the victim might gain from an HIV test is just as
easily obtained by testing herself rather than the defendant. Thus,
after this point, California's interest in protecting the health of the
victim would never be served by testing the defendant.
(ii) "Special needs "justify lack of probable cause
Although California's interest may outweigh the defendant's
privacy interest for the six months immediately following the attack,
the California statute might be considered unreasonable since it
does not require a showing of probable cause before testing the de-
fendant.' 46 In Skinner, the Court held that probable cause is not
constitutionally required in "special needs" searches, provided the
search is minimally intrusive, the government interest is important,
and a requirement of probable cause would jeopardize the impor-
tant government interest being furthered by the search.' 47 As dis-
cussed above, a blood test for HIV is minimally intrusive, and
California's interest in the victim's health is compelling. 148 There-
fore, whether the California statute passes the Skinner test turns on
whether California's interest would be jeopardized by a requirement
of probable cause. In other words, would California's interest in the
victim's health be jeopardized if the prosecutor were required to
demonstrate probable cause that the defendant was HIV positive?
The only method by which the prosecutor might demonstrate
143 See supra notes 13-41 and accompanying text.
144 See supra note 17.
145 See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
146 See supra notes 121-26 and accompanying text.
147 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1417; see also supra text accompanying notes 99-107.
148 See supra notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
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probable cause would be to show that the defendant is a member of
a high risk group. However, risk grouping is unworkable for three
reasons. First, since prevalence rates of HIV infection vary both by
group and by city, probable cause would turn on the geographic
situs of the attack and the group of which the defendant is a mem-
ber. If the attack occurs in New York City and the defendant is an
intravenous drug user, there is probable cause to test the defendant
since there is a fifty percent probability that the defendant is HIV
positive.' 49 However, if the same attack occurred in Los Angeles,
probable cause disappears because there is only a four percent
chance the defendant who is an intravenous drug user is infected
with HIV.' 50 The state's interest in the victim's health is the same in
both cases, but whether that interest is jeopardized turns on what
city the defendant is from.
Second, because of the geographical gaps in the prevalence
rates and the mobility of the population whose HIV status is mea-
sured by those rates, the statistics do not lend themselves to deter-
minations of probable cause. If the attack occured in Los Angeles,
but the defendant moved there four years ago from New York, the
prosecutor would have no figure approximating the probability that
the defendant is HIV positive; neither the New York nor the Los
Angeles statistics would apply. Regardless of where the defendant
is from, or whether a prevalence rate has been computed for that
particular city, the state's interest in the victim's health is the same.
Thus, except in rare "easy cases,"'' to require a prosecutor to
demonstrate probable cause would jeopardize California's interest
in the victim's health.
In addition to jeopardizing California's interest, demonstrating
probable cause by risk grouping is morally repugnant. To prove
that the defendant is a member of a high risk group, the prosecutor
would have to show that the defendant is either homosexual or an
intravenous drug user. Such a requirement invites stereotyping and
would turn the probable cause hearing into a trial by innuendo and
association.
Since there is no method other than risk grouping by which to
determine probable cause of HIV infection, the California statute
satisfies Skinner's three conditions for suspicionless searches: the
HIV test is minimally intrusive; the state's interest in the victim's
health is compelling; and the state interest would be jeopardized by
149 1988 Update, supra note 22, at 171.
150 Id.
151 An example of an easy case is described in Jan Hoffman, Aids and Rape: Should
New York Test Sex Offenders, Village Voice, Sept. 12, 1989, at 40, where the victim's at-
tacker was arrested with a hypodermic needle in his pocket.
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requiring a showing of probable cause. However, even though the
California statute satisfies the Skinner test for suspicionless searches,
the HIV test is constitutionally reasonable only for up to six months
following the attack, and then only if the victim has not already
tested HIV positive herself. After the six month period has passed,
the state's interest in the victim's health does not outweigh the in-
trusion into the defendant's privacy interest. At this point, the HIV
test would be an unreasonable search under the fourth amendment,
and the search would therefore be unconstitutional.
3. The New York Statute: No Challenge to the Fourth Amendment
The New York statute does not create a fourth amendment
problem because it requires that a person being tested give his writ-
ten, informed consent before being tested, 152 and does not provide
an exception for mandatory HIV testing of sex offenders.' 53 New
York's failure to require testing of sex offenders in its comprehen-
sive AIDS statute prevents the innocent victim from obtaining the
information she needs in order to act. If New York provided for
mandatory HIV testing as California does, the state's interest in the
health of its citizens would certainly justify the invasion the search
entails.
B. Disclosure of HIV Test Information: Violation of a
Constitutionally Protected Right to Privacy?
1. Constitutional Framework
In Roe v. Wade,154 the seminal case establishing a woman's right
to an abortion as part of a constitutionally protected privacy right,
the Supreme Court enunciated the test for evaluating statutes that
limit the right to privacy. The Court held that if the privacy right is
so fundamental as to be constitutionally protected, the statute limit-
ing that right must be justified by a compelling state interest, and
the statute must be narrowly drawn to effect only the legitimate in-
terest at stake. 155 However, the Court failed to provide a methodol-
ogy for determining whether the affected privacy right falls within
the protection of the Constitution. After reviewing cases where a
constitutional right to privacy had been found, the Court located the
right to privacy "in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of per-
sonal liberty and restrictions upon state action."' 156
152 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2781 (McKinney Supp. 1990).
153 For a discussion of the two exceptions the statute does allow, see supra notes 50-
56 and accompanying text.
154 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
155 Id. at 155.
156 Id. at 152.
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In Whalen v. Roe,15 7 a unanimous Supreme Court'5 8 defined the
scope of the constitutional right to privacy and enumerated two
kinds of protected interests: the individual interest in avoiding dis-
closure of personal matters, 15 9 and the interest in independence in
making certain kinds of important decisions.' 60 The privacy interest
implicated by HIV disclosure clearly falls into the first category.
The statute at issue in Whalen required doctors to file copies of
all prescriptions for amphetamines, cocaine, methadone, opium,
and opium derivatives in a databank maintained by the New York
State Department of Health. 16 1 New York had implemented this
statute as part of an extensive overhaul of its drug laws to prevent
the widespread abuse of drugs available by prescription. 162 Plaintiff
doctors and patients opposed the new law, claiming that the statute
violated the privacy rights of individuals with a legitimate need for
these drugs. In addition to requiring involuntary disclosure of drug
usage, plaintiffs argued that the possibility of further unauthorized
disclosure created a fear of being stigmatized as a drug addict,
which would influence individuals to decline needed medication.' 63
In deciding whether the statute was constitutional, the Court
considered the three ways in which disclosure might come about:
first, Health Department employees charged with security of the in-
formation might violate the statute and disclose the information to
others; second, the information might be revealed as part of a crimi-
nal proceeding; or third, the doctor or pharmacist might reveal the
prescription information to a third party. 64 Since the third possibil-
ity existed before the databank's creation, 165 and the other two pos-
sibilities had no support, either on the record or in the experience
of states with similar programs, 166 the Court concluded that the pos-
sibility of disclosure did not "pose a sufficiently grievous threat to
157 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
158 Justice Stewart dissented from that part of the majority opinion that could be
construed to create a privacy interest in disclosure. Id. at 610 (StewartJ, concurring).
159 Id. at 599 n.25 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 79 (1974)
(Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 78 (Powell, J., concurring)).
160 Whaen, 429 U.S. at 600 n.26 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connect-
icut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897)).
161 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 594.
162 Id. at 592.
163 Id. at 595.
164 Id. at 600.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 601.
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either [privacy] interest to establish a constitutional violation." 167
Furthermore, the statute's requirement that doctors disclose pre-
scribed drug use to the Health Department was not "meaningfully
distinguishable from a host of other... invasions of privacy that are
associated with many facets of health care."1 68
Since Whalen, the Supreme Court has implicitly established a
two-part test for determining whether the privacy interest in nondis-
closure is implicated: first, the information disclosed must be of a
peculiarly private nature; and second, the information must be dis-
closed beyond government officials. Several cases illustrate the
Court's application of this test. In New York v. Ferber,169 the
Supreme Court found that children who had been depicted in por-
nographic films and pictures had a constitutionally protected pri-
vacy right in nondisclosure. According to the Court, the childrens'
nudity was peculiarly private and the depictions of their bodies were
distributed commercially.170 When President Nixon attempted to
invoke this privacy interest in nondisclosure of archival material in
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,171 the Court did not even
reach the second part of the test, and held that the information was
not private enough to be considered peculiarly personal. 172 In Skin-
ner,'73 the Court conceded that although information given in a
medical history was extremely personal, it did not give rise to a con-
stitutionally protected privacy right because there was no indication
that the information was disclosed to anyone other than Govern-
ment officials. Finally, in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists,174 the Supreme Court struck down a Pennsylvania
statute that required doctors who performed abortions to file de-
tailed information regarding the woman, the doctor, and the cir-
cumstances surrounding the abortion, which the state then made
available to the public.' 75 Even though the Court did not use the
test developed in Whalen and its progeny to find a privacy interest in
nondisclosure, Thornburgh is consistent with Whalen: information re-
garding one's abortion is extremely private, and the Pennsylvania
167 Id. at 600.
168 Id. at 602. Because the Whalen Court did not find that the statute implicated a
constitutionally protected right to privacy, the Court never reached the balancing test
prescribed by Roe v. Wade. HoweverJustice Brennan noted in concurrence that if such a
right were implicated, the statute would be constitutional only "if it were necessary to
promote a compelling state interest." Id. at 607 (Brennan, J., concurring).
169 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
170 Id. at 759 n.10.
171 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
172 Id. at 457-58.
173 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
174 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
175 Id. at 766.
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statute unconstitutionally required disclosure of this information to
the public.
2. The California Statute's Disclosure Requirements are
Unconstitutional
a. California statute implicates the privacy right in nondisclosure
Under the analysis of Whalen and its progeny, 176 the California
statute implicates a constitutionally protected privacy right because
the revealed HIV information is highly personal, and the statute
does not limit disclosure to the government.
In contrast to the Whalen statute, which required the disclosure
of prescription information, the California statute requires the de-
fendant to disclose his HIV status. Unlike prescription information,
one's HIV status is "meaningfully distinguishable from a host of
other.., invasions of privacy." 177 Examining the effect public dis-
closure of the information could have on the defendant illustrates
that one's HIV status is inherently more private than one's drug use.
At most, the plaintiffs in Whalen feared the social stigma that would
result from being labeled drug addicts if their use of prescribed her-
oin or cocaine was publicly disclosed. 178 The Supreme Court held
that this fear was unfounded. 179 In contrast, disclosure of HIV sta-
tus is far more stigmatizing,180 and is likely to lead to discrimination
in housing, employment and health care.' 8 ' Individuals who have
176 See supra notes 169-75 and accompanying text.
177 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977).
178 Id. at 596.
179 Id. at 601-02.
180 See generally Michael Closen, Susan Marie Connor, Howard L. Kaufmnan & Mark E.
Wojcik, AIDS: Testing Democracy--Irrational Responses to the Public Health Crisis and the Need
for Privacy in Serologic Testing, 19 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 835, 840-41 (1986) [hereinafter
Testing Democracy].
181 In its investigation into the spread of HIV in the United States, the Presidential
Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Epidemic (the Commission) was continu-
ally confronted with evidence of HIV discrimination: "At virtually every Commission
hearing, witnesses have attested to discrimination's occurrence and its serious repercus-
sions for ... the individual who experiences it." PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE
HuM IMMUNODEFICIENCY EPIDEMIC, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE
HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY EPIDEMIC 119 (1988) [hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL REPORT].
The Commission pointed out by way of illustration that reports of HIV discrimination to
the New York City Commission on Human Rights rose from three in 1983 to almost 600
in 1987. Id. at 120.
Reports of HIV discrimination arise in other contexts as well. HIV-infected defend-
ants have been barred from courtrooms in Alabama, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1988, at A21,
col. 1, and Maryland, Testing Democracy, supra note 180, at 841 n. 19. In California, a man
with AIDS won a discrimination suit he brought against a salon that cancelled his pedi-
cure appointment after learning he had AIDS. L.A. Times, Dec. 22, 1989, at B2, col. 1.
HIV discrimination has been the motivating force behind several statutes protecting
HIV confidentiality. See, e.g., 1988 N.Y. LAws 584, § 1, quoted in N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§ 2780 (McKinney Supp. 1990); R.I. GEN. LAwS § 23-6-10 (1989).
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tested HIV positive have been burned out of their homes, 1 2 denied
entry into offices,183 ordered not to touch the telephones and com-
puters of coworkers, 1 4  and refused medical service by
paramedics8 5 and nursing homes.'8 6
The Whalen statute limited disclosure to the state. In contrast,
the California statute permits the victim to disclose the defendant's
HIV status as she deems necessary to protect the health and safety
of herself, her sexual partners, and her family,'8 7 with total immu-
nity from civil liability.' 88 The potential of further disclosure from
this ever widening circle of people who know the accused's HIV sta-
tus increases the likelihood of discrimination, and clearly violates
Whalen's requirement that disclosure be strictly limited to govern-
ment officials. Since one's HIV status is peculiarly personal, and the
California statute requires this information to be disclosed beyond
government officials, the California statute implicates the constitu-
tionally protected privacy interest in nondisclosure.
b. The California statute is not narrowly tailored enough to be
constitutional in every application
Although the California statute infringes upon the accused's
right to privacy, the statute may still be constitutional under Roe v.
Wade '89 if the state interest served by the statute is compelling, and
the statute is narrowly drawn so as to effect only the interest at
stake. 190 California's stated purpose in testing accused sex offend-
ers is "to benefit the victim of a crime by informing the victim
whether the defendant is infected with the AIDS virus" in order "to
protect the health of... [the] victims of crime."' 191 As noted earlier,
the Supreme Court has consistently found the states' interest in the
health of their citizens to be compelling. 192
However, although California's interest in protecting the health
of victims of sex offenses is compelling, the California statute is not
narrowly drawn so as to serve only this interest. If the victim learns
that she is HIV positive prior to learning the results of the defend-
ant's HIV test, the state's interest in protecting the victim's health is
182 N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1988, § 1, at 20, col. 3.
183 Testing Democracy, supra note 180, at 841.
184 Newsday, Nov. 7, 1988, at 27 (Manhattan ed.).
185 Legal Times, Mar. 20, 1989, at 7.
186 Newsday, Sept. 14, 1989, at 6.
187 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524.1(i) (West Supp. 1990).
188 Id. § 1524.1(j).
189 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
190 Id at 155.
191 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524.1(a) (West Supp. 1990).
192 See supra note 129.
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not served by disclosing the results of the defendant's HIV test. 193
Similarly, six months after the attack, disclosure of the defendant's
HIV status does not give the victim any knowledge that she could
not obtain through testing herself. 194
Since the statute permits the victim to learn the defendant's
HIV status even when that information is unnecessary for her to de-
termine her own HIV status, the statute is not narrowly tailored to
serve California's interest in protecting the health of the victim, and
thus the California statute is unconstitutional.
3. The New York Statute's Disclosure Requirements are
Constitutional
Under the Whalen analysis, 195 the New York statute implicates
the constitutionally protected privacy right in nondisclosure. As dis-
cussed above, one's HIV status is peculiarly personal. 196 This fact,
combined with the New York statute's provision allowing disclosur6
to health care facilities providing medical services to HIV positive
individuals, 197 implicates the privacy right in nondisclosure of
highly personal information.
However, disclosure doesn't render the New York statute un-
constitutional because, under the framework set forth in Roe v.
Wade,198 the state's interest in requiring disclosure is compelling
and the statute is narrowly tailored to serve the state's interest.' 99
The statute ensures that the state interest in disclosure is compel-
ling by requiring a court to find that "a clear and imminent danger"
to the victim's life or health exists before allowing the court to order
disclosure. 200 Three provisions guarantee that the statute is so nar-
rowly drawn that the court cannot order disclosure unless this com-
pelling state interest is served. First, before ordering disclosure, the
statute instructs the court to assess the need for the test by balanc-
ing the victim's need for disclosure against the privacy interests of
the defendant. 20 1 Second, the statute expressly limits court-ordered
disclosure to the "person[] whose need for the information is the
basis for the order." 20 2 Finally, the statute expressly prohibits redis-
193 See supra text accompanying note 143.
194 See supra text accompanying note 145.
195 See supra notes 169-75 and accompanying text.
196 See supra notes 180-86 and accompanying text.
197 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2782.1(c) (McKinney Supp. 1990); see also supra text
accompanying note 58.
198 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
199 Id. at 155.
200 N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 2785.2(b) (McKinney Supp. 1990).
201 Id. § 2785.5.
202 Id. § 2785.6(b).
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closure to any persons other than the victim. 20 3
Taken together, these provisions ensure that the New York
statute is constitutional in every application because court-ordered
disclosure of the defendant's HIV status will only occur when neces-
sary to protect the health of the victim. The New York statute im-
plicitly prohibits disclosure to a victim who already knows her HIV
status, because her need for disclosure is outweighed by the defend-
ant's privacy interest in nondisclosure.
C. A Proposal for Mandatory HIV Testing of Defendants
Accused of Sexual Offenses
As California and New York have recognized, the deadly nature
of AIDS and the inability to detect the virus immediately after trans-
mission warrant some mechanism that allows victims of sexual of-
fenses to have their attackers tested for AIDS, and for the results of
those tests to be disclosed to the victims. 20 4 At the same time, the
very real fear of AIDS discrimination 20 5 necessitates that the defend-
ant's privacy be highly protected. Neither the New York statute nor
the California statute fully recognizes the competing interests of the
victim and the defendant. 20 6
The New York statute strikes the ideal balance between the de-
fendant's privacy interests and the victim's need for disclosure, 20 7
but the statute fails to provide for testing the defendant.208 In com-
parison, the California statute's rough and ready rule for compul-
sory testing20 9 fails to consider whether testing210 or disclosure211 is
always warranted. An ideal statute would provide some mechanism
by which an accused sex offender is tested for HIV, with the results
of that test then being released to the victim in a manner that does
not trample the defendant's privacy interests.
The statute should require the state's need for conducting the
search to be balanced against the defendant's reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy prior to testing the defendant for HIV. In applica-
tion, the state's interest in protecting the victim's health will justify
the intrusion into the defendant's privacy interest so long as three
203 Id
204 In addition to New York and California, 21 other states have recognized this
same need. See supra notes 4 & 6.
205 See supra notes 180-86.
206 For a discussion of the New York statute's shortcomings, see supra notes 152-53
and accompanying text. For an analysis of the California statute's shortcomings see
supra notes 127-51, 176-94 and accompanying text.
207 See supra notes 195-203 and accompanying text.
208 See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
209 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524.1 (West Supp. 1990).
210 See supra notes 127-51 and accompanying text.
211 See supra notes 176-92 and accompanying text.
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conditions are satisfied. First, the victim must demonstrate prob-
able cause to believe that the defendant was her attacker, and prob-
able cause to believe that semen or blood was transferred from the
defendant to the victim. Although neither showing would establish
a probability that her attacker had AIDS, this requirement would
restrict compulsory testing to those individuals who could possibly
have transmitted HIV to the victim. Second, the victim must be
tested and the result of her test must be HIV negative. Finally, if the
victim does test negative, the defendant must be tested within the
six month period immediately following the attack.
Before disclosing the test results to the victim, the statute
should require the court to engage in a balancing test similar to that
contained in the New York statute.21 2 This balance would ensure
that the state's compelling interest in the health of the victim was
served by disclosure of the defendant's HIV status. Should the
court decide that disclosure is warranted, the accused's right to pri-
vacy should be protected from further disclosure to anyone other
than the victim's current sexual partner by the threat of civil penal-
ties. In application, this balancing test for disclosure would not pro-
duce a different result from the balancing test for testing. If the
victim were able to prevail in getting the defendant tested, she
would also prevail in learning the results of that test.
Such a statute would acknowledge the victim's need to know
her attacker's HIV status, and at the same time it would amply pro-
tect the defendant's privacy interest. The balancing required of the
court ensures that the statute will not be rendered unconstitution-
ally invasive by advances in AIDS research.21 3 For example, if a
method were developed which tested for the presence of HIV itself,
rather than the antibodies formed in reaction to HIV as both ELISA
and the Western Blot do, 21 4 the lag between exposure to HIV and
seropositivity would shorten to a predictable period of time, making
it possible to test the victim conclusively, and obviating the need to
test the accused. This proposed statute respects the divergent
rights of all parties involved, and balances them in such a way as to
allow for inevitable changes in our knowledge of AIDS.
CONCLUSION
This Note has analyzed the constitutional infirmities of two dif-
ferent responses to mandatory HIV testing of sex offenders and dis-
212 See supra notes 198-203 and accompanying text.
213 Cf Note, The Constitutional Rights of AIDS Carriers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1280
(1986) (arguing that any AIDS-related legislation should reflect rapid advances in medi-
cal technology).
214 Screening, supra note 14, at 260.
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closure of the offender's HIV status to his victim. This Note
proposes a statute that instructs courts to balance the victim's need
to know her attacker's HIV status against both the defendant's con-
stitutionally protected fourth amendment privacy right, and the de-
fendant's constitutionally protected privacy right in nondisclosure
of peculiarly personal information, before requiring the defendant
to be tested or disclosing the defendant's HIV status to the victim.
In performing these balances, the court should evaluate the strength
of the victim's need to know in light of any new developments in
AIDS research that might inform its decision.
David Kennon Moody
